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Abstract
The use of macro prudential instruments today gives rise to a major debate within 
the walls of central banks and other authorities in charge of financial stability. 
Contrary to micro prudential instruments, whose effects remain limited, macro 
prudential instruments are different in nature and can affect the stability of the fi-
nancial system. By influencing the financial cycle and the financial structure of fi-
nancial institutions, the use of such instruments should be conducted with great 
vigilance as well as macroeconomic and financial expertise. But the experiences 
of central banks in this area are sketchy, and only some emerging countries have 
experience using these types of instruments in different ways. This paper presents 
an analysis of instruments of macro prudential policy and attempts to empirically 
demonstrate that these instruments should be used only in specific economic and 
financial situations. Indeed, the results obtained, using modeling bivariate panel, 
confirm that these instruments are more effective when used to mitigate the eupho-
ria of financial and economic cycles. In this sense, the output gap, describing the 
economic cycle, and the Z-score are the intermediate variables for the activation 
of capital instruments. Moreover, the liquidity ratio and changes in bank profita-
bility are the two early warning indicators for activation of liquidity instruments.
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1. Introduction 
In response to post-crisis developments, central banks have reacted in two ways. 
The first was focused on a massive use unconventional policies to restore growth, 
avoid a deflationary spiral, and energize the various capital markets to reduce long-
term risk premiums. The second way was structured around macro-prudential pol-
icies aimed at strengthening the resilience of the financial system and restoring 
stability. Similarly, interest in macro prudential policy has largely been empha-
sized in connection with the new missions assigned to central banks, which are 
now responsible for price stability and also help to maintain financial stability.
In and of itself, macro-prudential policy aimed at hedging against the nega-
tive effects of financial instability. In this perspective, the new policy is able to re-
duce and limit the exposure to systemic risk in order to guard against a financial 
crisis. It mainly focuses on interactions between financial institutions, markets, 
and infrastructures, and their relationship to the economy as a whole. Thus, mac-
ro-prudential policy is geared more towards the prudential management of the fi-
nancial cycle and its interaction with the business cycle, and it also incorporates 
the transverse dimension by focusing on the nature of relationships, direct and in-
direct, in the financial and economic systems.
Thus, by introducing a macro-prudential policy as a new mission of central 
banks, both objectives are targeted. Firstly, it will strengthen the resilience of the 
financial system in the face of economic contractions and exogenous shocks that 
may cause a reversal of financial and economic cycles. The second objective is to 
limit the accumulation of financial risks by reducing bilateral and sectorial expo-
sures and financial booms that could result in asset bubbles.
It is clear that the objectives of macro prudential policy go beyond those of the 
micro prudential policy, which focuses on the individual situations of financial in-
stitutions. Thus, micro prudential regulation ensures that each institution is ade-
quately capitalized and sufficiently liquid to individually absorb shocks. In con-
trast, macro prudential policy takes into account systemic risk. For example, in case 
of shock to an institution, the macro prudential approach focuses solely on the con-
sequences of the latter on the other institutions by examining the interconnections 
and potential contagion channels.
In order to implement macro prudential policies, government authorities be-
gan to allocate to the central banks macro prudential instruments to guard against 
the likelihood of materialization of systemic risk and the pro-cyclicality of the fi-
nancial system.
These instruments are defined as preventive tools able to target one or more 
sources of systemic risk. Overall, these tools are prudential and preventive in na-
ture. In this sense they are used in situations of financial instability to guard against 
a financial turnaround cycle that can result in a systemic crisis. The use of these 
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instruments is therefore intended to reduce the pro-cyclicality of the financial sys-
tem (rapid credit growth and asset bubbles) to limit deleveraging movements and 
guard against systemic risk liquidity.
In practice, three families of macro prudential instruments are available. The 
first relates to capitalization instruments; the second concerns liquidity; and the 
last is used to target asset prices, including those of real estate assets. The choice 
to use any of these instruments is not arbitrary but is conditioned by several pre-
requisites in connection with financial stability evaluation devices and the corre-
lation between the business cycle and financial cycle.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First we define and pres-
ent the macro prudential instruments that are in use today in various countries 
in different ways. Then we will examine the experiences of countries in terms 
of their activation by establishing in advance their effect on the economic and fi-
nancial environment. The next part of the paper presents a logit model in panel 
to verify the determinants framing the use of macro prudential instruments. In-
deed, this point is aimed at trying to identify the reasons of activation of these in-
struments by central bank in an environment at risk, and to reverse or affirm their 
counter-cyclical nature.
2. Macro prudential instrument and the business cycle
The implementation of macro prudential instruments is determined by a relevant 
and rigorous assessment of the risks and vulnerabilities of the financial system. 
In fact, improper use of these instruments may induce adverse effects on the sta-
bility of the financial system and the economic cycle. Thus, activation (or deacti-
vation) which is delayed or premature may be a major source of financial instabil-
ity and therefore lead to imbalances in the financial system.
In this sense, two approaches for articulating the use of macro prudential in-
struments are available: a top-down and bottom-up approach. According to the 
first approach, macro prudential decisions are guided by a comprehensive assess-
ment of risks to financial stability and the choice of the proper instruments to be 
used depends on a set of signals released via several indicators and risk assessment 
models (including stress test models). In contrast, the second approach (bottom-up) 
is based on a review of various macro prudential instruments with a description 
of their advantages and disadvantages and their ability to address a particular form 
of vulnerability.
The choice between these two approaches depends on the state of the test de-
vices available to the authorities. Thus, if there is a run-analytical framework, the 
top-down approach allows for a better exploitation of macro prudential policy. 
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In contrast, in situations where proper devices are unavailable a close examination 
of the instruments seems to be an acceptable solution.
Furthermore, the activation of macro prudential instruments depends on the 
economic and financial conditions of each country. Indeed, the use of these instru-
ments has largely altered the nature of the synchronization between the business 
cycle and financial cycle (see Table 1). Several scenarios are considered, accord-
ing to the characterization of the financial cycle and its relationship to macroeco-
nomic conditions. 
Thus in the case of existence of a financial boom and favorable macroeco-
nomic conditions (strong), it is necessary to activate macro prudential instruments 
to guard against a sudden bursting of the financial bubble, allow a soft landing the 
financial cycle, and consequently strengthen financial system resilience (Table 1, 
case 1). However, in a reverse situation – where the economic conditions are tight 
and the financial cycle is bullish – it is better not to operationalize macro pruden-
tial instruments due to the difficulty of assessing the consequences of such a de-
cision on the financial cycle and economic conditions. In this context, a decision 
to activate the instruments during this period may precipitate the deflation of an 
asset bubble and lead to an increase in default rates (Table 1, case 2). 
The use of macro prudential instruments and the financial cycle turnaround 
time is even more delicate and remains controversial. In the presence of a financial 
crisis and weak macroeconomic conditions, it is more appropriate to abandon the 
use of these instruments to avoid deleveraging flows and credit rationing policies1 
(Table 1, case 3). In contrast, if the financial cycle is reversed without being in the 
presence of a financial crisis, two scenarios are possible. If the economic envi-
ronment is favorable, then the status quo may be the best choice (Table 1, case 4). 
However, if economic conditions appear to be difficult in this case it would be bet-
ter to drop the macro prudential instruments already in place to avoid the emer-
gence of a financial crisis and help to revive the real economy (Table 1, case 5).
The last and most critical situation is one of weak macroeconomic conditions 
associated with a financial crisis. In this configuration macro prudential instru-
ments cannot be effective and the preventive objective cannot be achieved because 
of financial frictions in the various markets and the unfavorable economic outlook2 
(Table 1, case 6).
1 Sometimes it is possible to activate macro prudential instruments capitalization to restore 
the solvency of institutions in financial crisis. However, this approach should be considered in the 
light of the economic and financial conditions in place.
2 In such situations some central banks have decided to impose increases in solvency ratios 
by using public funds (e.g. the United States) to strengthen the solvency of the financial system.
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Table 1. Enabling or abandoning instruments as the economic and financial conditions change
 Financial cycle
Boom DownturnWith crisis Without crisis
Macroeconomic 
conditions
Forces Activate instruments(Case 1)
No (concerning 
case 6)
Status quo 
(case 4)
Weak Not activate(Case 2)
Discard instru-
ments (case 3)
Discard instru-
ments (case 5)
Source: BIS (DEC.2012).
Although the use of macro prudential tools depends on the domestic econom-
ic and financial conditions, other factors also must be taken into consideration. In-
deed, several financial and banking institutions have a foreign operations are highly 
developed and more dependent on the economic and financial conditions of other 
countries (changes in asset prices, monetary and financial decisions, and public 
policies). In this context, the macro prudential instruments to apply to such institu-
tions (as a consolidated) should not only take into account the dynamics of a single 
country, but international conditions, in particular those of the host country.
3. What Macro prudential instrument?
Ideally the choice of an appropriate macro prudential instrument is carried out 
based on a top-down analysis to identify vulnerabilities (risk indicators) and to as-
sess the resilience of the financial system (stress testing device), in order to define 
the most appropriate instrument to limit the financial vulnerabilities identified.
To this end, policymakers in macro prudential policy will have to use these 
instruments to ensure financial stability. However, they must ensure that the ac-
tivation (or deactivation) of such instruments entails negative externalities. Thus, 
examining the effects of these instruments on the financial system and the mac-
roeconomic conditions is crucial to avoid the emergence of financial crises.
3.1. Solvency instrument
The solvency instruments are designed to strengthen the resilience of financial 
institutions. There are three in use: own funds contra cyclical; sectorial capital 
requirements; and dynamic provisioning. Countercyclical capital is formed to op-
pose a reversal of the financial cycle in order to strengthen the solvency ratio 
in a boom period. The second instrument is sectorial in nature and is intended 
to protect against high exposure vis-à-vis a particular sector. Furthermore, dy-
namic provisioning, which affects banks’ profits, it be composed of provisioned 
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amounts, which depend on the nature of the financial cycle, designed to cope with 
unexpected losses.
These instruments directly affect the solvency ratio, which in turn has an ef-
fect on the degree of resilience of the financial system and the growth of credit 
in the economy. With respect to the financial system resilience, higher solvency 
ratios or other credit enhancement mechanisms directly impact the ability of banks 
to withstand losses. However, an increase in demand in terms of one’s own funds 
negatively impacts credit growth. While the decline in credit growth promotes sol-
vency due to decreases in weighted risks, at the same time such measures result 
in a decline in investment and consumption.
Indeed, banks may react in different ways:
• a decrease in dividends paid to shareholders;
• an increase in interest rate spreads;
• a capital increase;
• or a decrease in the leverage ratio (acting on assets).
The first three options available to the banks are likely to adversely affect 
the demand and supply of credit by go up the interest rate spreads due to higher 
funding costs. However, reducing assets (a low leverage ratio, debt strategy, or al-
ternative policies of risky assets to risk-free assets) results in a decreased supply 
of credit.
Furthermore, when the controller uses the industry requirements in terms 
of capital, it directly affects the outstanding loans to the targeted sector. In this 
framework, financial institutions find it difficult to drain investments, pushing them 
to abandon the projects to this sector (Figure 1).
Empirically, all work aligns with the fact that the use of credit instruments 
is able to strengthen the resilience of the financial system and significantly reduce 
economic growth and outstanding loans to the economy. This largely justifies their 
use by many emerging central banks in times of financial boom.
Thus, on the basis of studies of the BIS (2010), it has been stated that a one 
percentage point increase in the requirements in terms of capital translates into 
a decline of 20–50% of the probability of emergence of a systemic crisis. Howev-
er, these studies also confirm that the activation of macro prudential instruments 
of capital results in a decrease in the credit cycle. Indeed, impact simulations show 
that an increase of one point in the solvency ratio induces a rise in yield spreads 
between 2 and 20 basis points. This is mainly due to the higher cost of financing 
in capital markets due to expectations of economic agents following the new mac-
ro prudential requirements set by the authorities.
Moreover, other studies of the BIS (2010) confirm that banks, in order 
to comply with macro prudential requirements, do not act only on equity but also 
on risk-weighted assets by reducing their exposure to risk. Empirical studies show 
that an increase of one point in the solvency ratio is likely to result in a decline 
of 1.5% to 3% of outstanding credit. Similarly, MAG (Macroeconomic Assessment 
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Group, 2010) estimates that an increase of 1 point in solvency ratios results in a re-
duction in appropriations of 1 to 2%, and a decrease in economic growth 0.04%. 
Figure 1. Description of the effects of the instruments for accumulation
Source: BIS (December 2012).
3.2. Liquidity risk instrument
Unlike instruments the solvency of financial institutions, liquidity instruments 
have only rarely been examined and studies concerning them remain limited. This 
is mainly explained by the fact that liquidity measures are still under discussion 
at the level of micro prudential regulation. Moreover, a consensus is still being 
established on several liquidity instruments namely: the ratio of liquidity coun-
tercyclical coverage; the stable funding ratio; minimum requirements for pension 
operations; reserve requirements, counter-cyclical margin requirements; and short-
term withdrawal from large debtors.
The introduction of these liquidity measures positively affects the resilience 
of the financial system. Indeed, banks with more liquidity are able to withstand 
stressful situations and thus reduce tensions on the various capital markets. Thus, 
increasing the liquidity of financial institutions limits the emergence of a risk 
of contagion and thus preserves the system against a systemic crisis.
In order to comply with the requirements of macro prudential authorities, 
banks will respond by choosing one of these options:
• replace short-term funding of long-term resources;
• replace unsecured financing by other secured financing;
• replace illiquid assets with other liquid assets;
• reduce the maturity of portfolios;
• Limit illiquid assets requiring stable resources.
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By using these devices, financial institutions may increase their stable fund-
ing through the reduction of short-term financing and the use of secured funding. 
These instruments are likely to increase the burden on banks and therefore funding 
costs. Also, replacement of illiquid assets by liquid assets and reducing the maturi-
ty of assets decrease bank profits. In this context, banks will be more encouraged 
to increase their intermediation margin instead of accepting a lower rate of profit. 
For this purpose, the rise in spreads would have adverse consequences on outstand-
ing loans by affecting the demand component, and in particular the long-term loans 
(Figure 2).
Empirical studies and international experiences in the use of liquidity instru-
ments are very limited. However, the Basel Committee (2010) argues that liquidi-
ty measures increase the resilience of the banking system by decreasing the prob-
ability of systemic crisis by 10% to 20%. Similarly, impact simulations estimate 
that the use of LCR (liquidity coverage ratios) can mitigate the negative effects 
of a liquidity drying and thus improve the resilience of the banking system.
Although impact studies show that liquidity instruments enhance the resil-
ience of the financial system, at the same time their impact on outstanding credit 
to the economy remains negative. Indeed, empirical studies confirm that the intro-
duction of these measures adversely affects the credit market by acting on supply 
and demand. Regarding demand, the new requirements in terms of liquidity are 
likely to rising interest rate spread due to higher funding costs. The assessments 
by the BIS (2010) demonstrate that these measures should increase the spreads 
of around 25 basis points. In the same vein, the adoption of the CSF is able to re-
duce the outstanding loans by nearly 3%.
Figure 2. Description of the effects of instruments for liquidity
Source: BIS (December 2012).
Similarly, other studies claim that the use of required reserves raises the in-
terest rate spreads and consequently reduces the outstanding credit. Moreover, the 
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entry into force of these measures may negatively affect economic growth. Indeed, 
the BIS estimation based on simulations indicate that the using of liquidity instru-
ment decrease GDP by 0.08%.
3.3. Asset price bubbles 
The instruments for asset prices are intended to regulate and tighten the conditions for 
granting credit in favor of some groups of borrowers. In practice, this family of instru-
ments often applies to home loans. Several derivative instruments are used, namely: 
LTV (ratio of the loan to the value of the property), LTI (loan income) and DTI (debt 
to income). These three instruments impose constraints on the granting of credit with 
reference to the value of property, income of borrowers, or their level of debt.
Similar to previous instruments, the active control instruments have positive 
effects on the resilience of the financial system. However, their implementation 
is reflected in a contraction of credit and economic growth. With regard to the re-
silience of the financial system, the adoption of these measures may reduce the 
probability of default of borrowers and therefore LGD (loss given default).
Figure 3. Description of the effects of instruments for liquidity
Source: BIS (December 2012).
However, the activation of these constraints directly impacts the outstanding 
loans by limiting loan amounts to a percentage of the value of goods, or by im-
posing restrictions in relation to the debt ratio. This results in a decrease in fund-
ing sources for some borrowers, negatively impacting the demand for credits. This 
policy is likely to stabilize asset prices and at the same time reduce the ability 
of households to obtain external financing (Figure 3).
Several studies have shown that the LTV, for example, is able to reduce the sensitiv-
ity of households and borrowers to adverse fluctuations in asset prices thus minimize the 
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probability of default. However, its implementation is likely to slow both credit growth 
and the value of asset prices. Indeed, the tightening of lending conditions across the LTV 
reduces the loan by 1 to 2% and depreciates the value of real estate by 2 to 5%.
4. International practices
The activation of macro prudential instruments is dependent on analyses carried 
out by the authorities in charge of macro prudential policy. In order for this policy 
to be effective, it is necessary that the activation decision be made in consultation 
with the macroeconomic objectives of the country.
For the purposes of this paper we examined the extent to which countries use 
different instruments. The objective was to assess, affirm, or disprove the success 
of these measures.
Hungary, being among the most active countries in the use of macro pruden-
tial instruments, is a textbook case. Indeed, Hungary has continued to use three 
types of instruments: capital, liquidity and regulation of real estate assets. Thus, 
between 1997 and 2010, the country has lowered the reserve requirement drasti-
cally, to stabilize at 2% in 2010 compared to 12% in 1997. Moreover, the solvency 
ratio remained stable at 8 %, but there was an activation of the LTV ratio during 
the period 2009–2010.Figur  4: Evolution of macro prudential instruments and activation reasons for Hungary 
 
Source: IMF Database (December 2012). 
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considered implementing the LTV ratio in order to counter the speculative bubble 
in the property market and also to slow the financial cycle. Another country with 
a similar dynamic is Romania. Several instruments have been deployed because 
of the effects of the financial cycle on the economic and financial environment.
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Figure 5. Evolution of macro prudential instruments and activation reasons for Romania
Source: IMF Database (December 2012).
Figure 6. Evolution of macro prudential instruments and activation reasons for Turkey
Source: IMF Database (December 2012).
Since 2002, Romania has experienced a boom in credit to the economy and 
therefore a financial boom cycle. Moreover, the liquidity ratio of credit institutions 
has declined. In response to this situation, regulators have begun to use several 
macro prudential instruments to guard against the materialization of risks. Thus 
the LTV and DTI have been established to fight against the exponential increase 
of the financial cycle and asset prices. Moreover, the solvency ratio and reserve re-
quirements have also been used to reduce liquidity risk and maintain the solvency 
of financial entities. This has impacted positively on the financial sector, recording 
a decline in credit from 2007.
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Turkey has also implemented some macro prudential instruments to protect 
itself against the pro-cyclicality of the financial system. In this regard, from 2004 
the financial cycle has increased and the coefficient of transformation has also 
increased. Similarly, the liquidity ratio decreased drastically, from 70% to 10% 
between 2005 and 2010. The reaction of regulators has been preventive, as since 
2006 several macro prudential measures have been introduced. These include the 
solvency ratio, the reserve requirement, and the LTV. From 2009, and in response 
to the massive influx of capital in the Turkish financial sector, the authorities in-
creased the reserve requirement to 8% instead of 5%.
Overall, international experiences with the use of macro prudential instru-
ments of capital, liquidity and asset price regulation shows that in all countries 
they were used in response to the financial cycle and are contra cyclical nature, due 
to their ability to reduce the pro cyclicality of the financial system. Based on this 
assumption, the following section provides empirical checks which constitute the 
determinants of the activation of these instruments. In other words, the model pro-
pose to determinate the key variables, that can help the central bank in order to fight 
against systemic risks and safeguard the resilience of the financial system.
5. The triggering of macro prudential instruments: empirical verification
The model that we have adopted to assess the macro-prudential policy in the coun-
tries of the panel is based on an estimate of the probability of use of these instru-
ments by the regulatory authorities. The bivariate variable that was selected is cal-
ibrated according to the instruments use of regulation. Since macro prudential 
instruments are of three families, two models were estimated for purpose of acti-
vating preventive control measures on capital and liquidity tools.
  Eq.1 1
The use of binary form panel data estimation a classic problem in terms 
of modeling. In this sense, the use of qualitative variable modeling is required. 
Indeed, the use of a linear model estimation results in a misleading estimate, 
in which the value of the activation probability of macro prudential instruments 
may allow values greater than 1 or less than 0, hence the use of the nonlinear spec-
ification.
Generally the qualitative variables modeling often uses models “logit” or “pro-
bit” to approximate the density function to be used. Although these functions are 
almost identical, many authors prefer to use a logistics specification because of its 
simplicity (Stock and Watson 2006) and the possibility to use it in the presence 
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of panel data. Thus, the use of this type of modeling for the case where the endog-
enous variable is qualitative gives rise to several difficulties. First, the estimation 
of panel data for discrete models can only be done in a conventional manner using 
the maximum likelihood (often used method for probit and logit) due to the exist-
ence of specific effects that impact the value of the estimators. Then the specifica-
tion of specific effects largely determines the pattern to use. Indeed, in case of fixed 
effects,3 only the logit model is applicable, while the probit model is unavailable 
due to computational complexity and the inconsistency of the estimator obtained. 
However, the use of a random effect gives more advantage to probit mainly due 
to the flexibility of the normal distribution. Thus, the choice of the nature of spe-
cific effects (random or fixed) is decisive in specification of the model used to es-
timate (Maddala 1987).
To choose between fixed and random individual specific effects, the Haus-
man test was used to compare the estimated fixed effect and the random effect. 
It should be noted that the estimate using the fixed effect is through the use of Con-
ditional maximum likelihood, while the random effect requires. The Hausman test 
is used to compare two estimators to achieve and verify the nature of the specif-
ic effects.
Hausman test
Khi-deux test 3.08 (0.54)
The results state the presence of non-specific effects correlated with exogenous 
variables from the indifference between fixed and random effects. In this perspec-
tive, the multivariate logistic approach can be chosen, although there is no differ-
ence between the two approaches.
The probability that the binary variable takes the value 1 (the instrument 
is used by regulatory authorities) at time t is given by the value of the cumulative 
logistic distribution evaluated at time t. that:
  Eq.1 2
With yit being the dummy variable representing the activation of the instru-
ment by one country at a time t, β the vector of the explanatory variables and coef-
ficients, and F(βxit) being the cumulative logistic distribution. The parameters are 
obtained by estimating the maximum conditional likelihood, so that the log-like-
lihood has the following form:
3 In the presence of a fixed end, the coefficient estimation using the conventional method 
is biased because of the correlation that may exist between the specific effects and the regressors 
(plim_{N→∞}β=2β). For this reason, and to eliminate the specific effect, we often use the condi-
tional maximum likelihood (relative to the specific effects). In this sense the Hausman test allows 
for a comparison between the two types of estimators to resolve the weak exogeneity problem that 
can arise due to the presence of specific effects.
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 Eq.1 3
The β estimated from this function do not represent constant marginal effects 
on the probability, since this relationship is nonlinear. Indeed, they reflect the ef-
fect of any change in an explanatory variable on log ( ):
 =  Eq.1 4
Thus, a variation in the probability of activation of instruments does not de-
pend solely on the initial probability, but also the values taken by each xit and their 
corresponding coefficients. In addition, each explanatory variable can have a dif-
ferent marginal contribution according to its original level. In other words, if the 
probability of occurrence was low from the start, a change in a given explanatory 
variable will have no significant effect on the probability Pit.
The use of fixed effect in the panel data logistic modeling requires the use 
of maximum conditional likelihood to eliminate specific effects. The conditional 
likelihood approach was first suggested by Chamberlain (1980) due to the inabili-
ty to apply a difference to the average used in such individual linear models4.
In general, logistics specification panel data is written as follows:
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Using a nonlinear model requires the use of a specific valuation method oth-
er than the ordinary least squares, including the maximum likelihood method. 
However, using a panel data specification makes it inconsistent in the presence 
of a specific effect, hence the use of the conditional likelihood method that elimi-
nates these effects in order to arrive at parameters of interest without leading to bi-
ased estimates (Maddala 1987).
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Using a nonlinear model requires the use of a specific valuation method 
other than the ordinary least squares, including the maxi um likelihood method. 
However, using a panel data specification makes it inconsistent in the presence 
of a specific effect, hence the use of the conditional likelihood method that 
eliminates these effects in order to arrive at parameters of interest without 
leading to biased estimates (Maddala 1987). 
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The set of explanatory variables in the previous section were tested in 
order to obtain those that may be included in the early warning model. On this 
register, the chosen specification is of the form: 
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With; 
                                                                 
4 Logit and probit models are nonlinear so it is impossible to eliminate the specific effect using 
only a simple difference. 
 .  
4 Logit and probit models are nonlinear so it i  impossible to eliminat  the specific ffect using 
only a simple difference.
131Determinants of The Application of Macro Prudential Instruments
The set of explanatory variables in the previous section were tested in order to ob-
tain those that may be included in the early warning model. On this register, the 
chosen specification is of the form:
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With;
β: The sensitivity coefficients , x(i,t): The exogenous variables depending on the na-
ture of macro prudential instruments, μi: Specific effects been fixed in the models 
used and according to the test specification, ε: Error.
The estimations were made on the basis of two types of models: the first ex-
plains the use of capital-building tools, the second describes the reasons for acti-
vation of liquidity instruments.
Macro prudential policies of the panel of the country were observed from 
1997 until 2010. The exogenous variables were chosen to describe three major 
characteristics of savings when using these instruments, in particular the econom-
ic cycle efficiency of the financial system, its development, and the level of risk 
(credit, liquidity and market) incurred. The results obtained are shown in the Ta-
ble below:
Table 2. Modeling of probability to use macro prudential instrument (capital and liquidity)
Model for Capital 
instruments
Model for Liquidity 
instruments
Coefficient transformation ratio - –12.866513**
Credit to GDP - 27.767734**
Net interest margin - –74.938918**
Inflation rate - –10.413981*
Output gap - –13.477299*
Output gap (-2) 28.236674* -
Z-Score 6.2206863* -
Coefficient transformation ratio (-1) –3.9778467 -
Coefficient of liquidity ratio (-2) –6.831542 -
chi2 16.266573 13.169411
aic 29.80708 52.108944
*p<.1; ** p<.05; ***p<.01
Source: Estimate by author.
Both models to explain the reasons why the activation macro prudential in-
struments appear to be significant. Indeed, the impact of the economic cycle and 
the risk to the banking system was positive on the activation of a decision apply 
macro prudential instruments to capital. Thus, the authorities use capital instru-
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ments in periods of growth and also in periods at risk, in order to protect them-
selves against the likely instability of the financial system. 
Moreover, conditions of liquidity and transformation negatively affect the prob-
ability of activation of capital instruments, and this can be explained by the fact that 
when the banking system is sufficiently liquid and the risk of transformation is quite 
large this reflects good conditions the financial system and low volatility.
In terms of liquidity instruments, the results of modeling indicate that financial 
development positively affects the activation of these instruments. Indeed, when 
financial development is important, which implies that the financial system is ex-
panding in terms of credit, the authorities must regulate the liquidity of the finan-
cial system to guard against financial instability. In contrast, economic growth, ef-
ficiency and liquidity of the financial system adversely affect the likelihood of use 
of liquidity instruments.
Table 3. Marginal effect for capital and liquidity instruments
Exogenous Marginal effect-capital instrument
Marginal effect-Liquidity 
instrument
Output gap 0.8494837 -0.074662
Z_score 0.1871457 -
Transformation coefficient -0.1196712 -0.0712784
Liquidity coefficient -0.2055229 -
Credit to GDP - 0.1538287
Net interest margin - -0.4151495
Inflation rate - -0.0576918
Source: Estimate by author.
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Source: estimate by author.
The marginal effects approximated by each explanatory variable affect the 
probability of activation of capital and liquidity instruments. The marginal ef-
fects will capture the significance of the estimated coefficients on the probability 
in question. 
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In terms of equity instruments, economic growth has a growing effect on ac-
tivation. When the economic cycle is ascending capital instruments reduce pro cy-
clicality of the financial system and control their ability to take risks. During this 
time the risk is undervalued, which means that financial actors are on their estimat-
ed solvency ratio and in this sense the authorities are encouraged to increase their 
requirements in terms of capital, regardless of the modality or instrument.
Moreover, profitability is the variable that best explains whether to use mac-
ro prudential instruments liquidity. Indeed, when the financial system generates 
significant results implies that liquidity conditions in the various markets are good 
and do not require the activation of these instruments.
Capital instrument: effect 
In order to extract the specificities of each country of the panel, we estimated the 
individual marginal effects. Morocco is an important feature, since it is based 
on four indicators (liquidity, transformation, growth and risk), which can be used 
to assess whether to implement macro prudential capital instruments.
Furthermore, we also examined the use of these instruments in an inter-tem-
poral context, in other words, countries use these instruments? Based on the anal-
ysis of dynamic coefficients in time, it is quite clear that, in fact, the importance 
of the coefficients is concentrated in two periods (7: 2005–2006 12: 2009–2010). 
This indicates that the use of active regulatory authority capital instruments dur-
ing periods of strong growth and in situations of economic expansion.
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Source: estimate by author.
The periods of 2005 and 2010 were marked in these countries by strong eco-
nomic and financial expansion, which explains the early response made by the 
country in question in enabling the implementation of capital instruments. 
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Liquidity instruments : effects 
The use of liquidity instruments is determined mainly by the effect of profitabil-
ity, in the direction where more banks are able to generate returns, unless they 
have constraints to clean up their situation in terms of liquidity. In this sense, the 
activation of liquidity instruments involves a drastic decline in banking income. 
Indeed, when it so declines banks will struggle to cope with their needs in terms 
of liquidity and invest in liquid assets, including assets with low levels of risk. 
In response, in this phase regulators will tend to activate macro prudential instru-
ments liquidity.
Temporally, the analysis of the changing dynamics of the coefficients over 
time indicates that liquidity instruments were used extensively during the period 
2009–2010. This is a translation of the effects of the international financial crisis. 
However, it should be noted that that liquidity instruments were also actively dur-
ing the previous periods, but to a lesser extent.
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6. Conclusions and remarks
The use of macro prudential instruments should be made after an analysis of risks 
and vulnerabilities, including a thorough examination of the degree of resilience 
of the financial system, using a “Top Down” approach. Indeed, these regulatory 
instruments are not mere tools to deploy, but political instruments whose impact 
is sometimes structural. In this sense, the authorities in charge of financial stabili-
ty should use these tools with great care so as not to lead to a reverse effect (Myo-
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pia Risk). Thus the activation of these instruments depends on a detailed analysis 
of the financial system and a descriptive point of view of its resilience. Thus, tools 
such as micro and macro stress tests will be of great importance to identify the 
risk areas requiring the use of macro prudential instruments.
Unbeknownst, in this paper so we have discovered that countries experienced 
in using macro prudential instruments have have based their decisions on certain 
key variables. Thus, the use of capital instruments is dependent on the macroe-
conomic conditions and the risk profile of financial institutions. In this sense, the 
output gap, describing the economic cycle, and the Z-score are the intermediate 
variables of macro prudential decision-making. Moreover, and in relation to liquid-
ity instruments the liquidity ratio and changes in bank profitability are two indica-
tors which need to be monitored carefully to make regulation more effective.
The above confirms that the majority of macro prudential instruments have 
been used to mitigate and provide for a soft landing of the financial cycle in order 
to guard against a sudden reversal, and in any case their use was solely related. 
Similarly, the results suggest that these instruments had a positive impact on the 
resilience of the financial system; however their use should be temporary (the time 
of activation and deactivation) so as not to generate negative externalities on the 
economic environment and macroeconomic balances.
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Streszczenie
INSTRUMENTY POLITYKI MAKROOSTROŻNOŚCIOWEJ: 
UŻYWAĆ WŁAŚCIWIE I Z REZERWĄ 
Stosowanie instrumentów makroostrożnościowych jest obecnie przedmiotem poważnej 
debaty, podejmowanej przez banki centralne i inne instytucje odpowiedzialne za stabilność 
finansową. Inaczej niż instrumenty mikroostrożnościowe, których skutki pozostają ogra-
niczone, instrumenty makro-ostrożnościowe mają inny charakter i mogą wpłynąć na sta-
bilność systemu finansowego. Z uwagi na wpływ na cykl finansowy i strukturę finansową 
instytucji finansowych, instrumenty te powinny być stosowane przy zachowaniu wielkiej 
ostrożności, oparciu o dostateczną wiedzę z zakresu makroekonomii i finansów. Jednak 
doświadczenia banków centralnych w tym zakresie są niewielkie a jedynie nieliczne gospo-
darki wschodzące mają doświadczenie w stosowaniu tego typu instrumentów. W artykule 
przedstawiono analizę tych instrumentów polityki makroostrożnościowej i podjęto próbę 
empirycznego dowiedzenia, że instrumenty te mogą być stosowane jedynie w szczególnych 
sytuacjach ekonomicznych i finansowych. Wyniki uzyskane z wykorzystaniem dwuwymia-
rowego (bivariate) modelu panelowego rzeczywiście potwierdzają większą skuteczność 
tych instrumentów w łagodzeniu skutków euforii związanej z cyklami finansowymi i go-
spodarczymi. W tym sensie luka produktowa, opisująca cykl gospodarczy oraz Z-score, 
są zmiennymi pośredniczącymi w procesie podejmowania decyzji o aktywacji instrumen-
tów kapitałowych. Ponadto, wskaźnik płynności oraz zmiany rentowności banku są dwoma 
wskaźnikami wczesnego ostrzegania wskazującymi na potrzebę aktywacji instrumentów 
płynnościowych.
Słowa kluczowe: stabilność finansowa, instrumenty makroostrożnościowe, ryzyko 
systemowe
